We de ne a new authentication tree in the symmetric key setting, which has the same computational, storage and security parameters as the well known Merkle Authentication Tree, but which unlike the latter, allows for all the cryptographic operations required for an update to be performed in parallel. The cryptographic operations required for veri cation can also be parallelized. We also prove the security of an optimized scheme which combines IAPM (Integrity Aware Parallelizable Mode) with the new parallelizable authentication tree.
Introduction
Merkle Authentication Trees 12] have found numerous applications in incremental authentication, hashing, and other cryptographic protocols. In its usual form, a large amount of data which may get updated in an incremental fashion, and which requires authentication is hashed in a tree fashion (either by a universal one-way hash function 3], or by an H-MAC 8]). If the tree has n leaves, then any update requires O(log n) hash function applications.
Similar number of operations are required for veri cation. For both update and veri cation to have this e ciency, all the internal node values need to be stored.
Note that when a leaf node's value gets updated, the hash function applications are inherently sequential, and cannot even be pipelined. In other words, to compute the value of the nodes in the new tree, all values of the children of a node must already be in place.
In certain applications, these O(log n) hash function applications can become prohibitively expensive, in light of the fact that the computations cannot even be pipelined. One such application is the checking of correctness of memory 3]. In this application, a storage device (e.g. RAM) may be vulnerable, open to attack from an adversary who 1 could read and modify the memory. However, a tamper proof processor may have small amount of internal memory and cache, which could store the root value of the authentication tree generated from the whole unprotected memory. The authentication tree may itself be stored unprotected, or maybe partially cached. A fast cryptographic processor inside the secure processor is required to generate the updated authentication tree without substantially deteriorating the performance of the overall system.
In this paper, we design a new authentication tree, which allows for all the cryptographic operations in the update and the veri cation process to be parallelized. As in the case of the Merkle tree, an update requires recomputing the values of a path from the updated leaf to the root, and the values of the neighboring path, resulting in O(log n) cryptographic operations. However, in the new authentication tree all the operations can be performed independently, and hence in parallel. This new authentication tree is de ned in the symmetric key setting. In other words, both the authenticating party and the verifying party must share the same secret key. Moreover, the cryptographic operations performed in the new authentication tree are block cipher invocations, i.e. we prove our security results in the pseudo-random permutation generator model (and not the H-MAC model 8]). We use the \whitening" with an XOR-universal (a weaker form of pairwise independence) sequence idea from the recent integrity-aware parallelizable mode IAPM 10] .
In the new authentication tree scheme, the authenticating party and the verifying party share two secret keys, one for the block cipher, and one for generating the XOR-universal sequence. The XOR-universal sequence is easily generated given the key and the index in the sequence (e.g. by a single multiplication in a Galois eld).
We now describe, rather tersely, the key ingredient of the new scheme. An update in the value of a leaf, requires the authenticating party to choose a new index per node in the path from this leaf to the root. This index just needs to be fresh, and hence can be chosen in a sequence. Next, the authentication tree is updated by encrypting the index value at each node (and the value chosen by the adversary for the leaves) by rst whitening it with the XOR-universal value generated from the index of its parent (and the relative position of the child). The encrypted value is also stored at the node as an integrity check.
Note that only about 2 log n block cipher invocations are required for the update (in a binary tree). Moreover, all the encryptions can be done in parallel, as the indices can be chosen in parallel. Verifying that a leaf node has the correct (authenticated) value requires checking all the integrity checks (i.e. encryption with whitening) on the path from this leaf to the root. Of course, the root value is assumed to be unaltered. The veri cation steps can also be done in parallel.
We prove, modeling the block cipher as a random permutation, that an adversary has probability O((s + n log s) 2 2 ?m ) of succeeding in forging a tree whose root value is same as that of the given authentication tree, where s is the number of nodes in the tree, n is the number of updates, and m is the size of the block cipher. We prove our result in the adaptive adversarial model, where the adversary can choose the update leaves and their values.
In section 4 we consider further optimizations.
In section 6 we demonstrate other alternative schemes.
In section 6, we address the problem of incremental authenticated encryption. The leafs in such a setting are allowed to store encrypted data, which must be authenticated by the tree in an incremental fashion. The encrypted of the data is done using IAPM ( 10]), with the modi cation that that the last block (authentication tag block) is pre-whitened using an index of the parent node of the leaf.
De nitions
De nition (Authentication Tree):
An Authentication Tree T is a structure T = (S; r; L; D; V; C), where S is a set of nodes, with r 2 S being the root. The leaves are the set of nodes L S. Let I be the internal nodes, i.e. I = S ? L. The map D : I f0; 1g!S is the daughter map, with 0 signifying the left daughter, and 1 signifying the right daughter. V and C are labels on S. There is no C-label on the root node r. The depth of a node is given by the function d, with the root being at depth d(r) = 0, and the children of a node at a depth one above that of the node.
We also have the obvious parent function U : S ? frg!S. De nition (Consistent Authentication Tree (CAT)): A Consistent Authentication Tree is C = (T; F; G), where T is an authentication tree, F is a random permutation , and G is an XOR-universal (in a weaker version pairwise independent) random function (i.e. G(i) xor G(j) is uniformly random for i 6 = j). Moreover the CAT C also satis es the following: 8s; t 2 I, s 6 = t, V (s) 6 = V (t) De nition An update sequence of CATs is a sequence of CATs, with the same F and G.
The sequence of CATs has the authentication tree sequence T 1 ; T 2 ; :::T n , where T i+1 is obtained from T i by replacing the labels of one of the leaves, and the labels on the nodes on the path to the root r, and the resulting change in the C-labels of the neighboring path (see below for a precise de nition). Superscripts on V and C will denote the V and C-labels in the corresponding tree. Let the leaf replaced in T i to obtain T i+1 be l(i). The nodes in the path from l(i) to the root, and the neighboring path will be called S i+1 . Lets call these nodes the updated nodes of round (i + 1). To be more precise, rst de neŜ i+1 (the updated path of round (i + 1)) to be the closure of the set fU(l(i))g under the parent relation U. In other words, if s 2 S is inŜ i+1 , then so is U(s). As a base case, U(l(i)) is inŜ i+1 . Also, de neŜ 1 = I. Then for i = 0 to n ? 1: S i+1 = fs 2 S ? frgj9j 2 f0; 1g; 9t 2Ŝ i+1 : D(t; j) = sg Fact 1: Two nodes s and t (s maybe same as t) which are inŜ i andŜ j respectively, for i 6 = j, will have di erent V -labels. In other words, V i (s) 6 = V j (t) if either s 6 = t, or s(= t) 2Ŝ i \Ŝ j . De nition A Colliding CAT C 0 = (T 0 ; F; G) on an update sequence of CATs as above, is an authentication tree T 0 with the same F, G, and S, and with the requirement that V 0 (r) = V n (r), i.e. the V -label of the root of the attack tree is the same as the V -label of the root of the last tree in the update sequence, and there exists a leaf l such that V 0 (l) 6 = V n (l), and all nodes s on the path from r to l (including r but excluding l) satisfy the consistency requirement:
where j is such that D(s; j) is the daughter of s on this path. Note that the colliding CAT is not required to satisfy the conditions mentioned for a CAT (see the de nition of CAT).
De nition: The success probability of an adversary which chooses the update leaf l(i) of each tree in the update sequence and the V -labels of these leaves, is given by the probability that it can generate a colliding CAT as above.
Main Result
Since the idea of whitening using an XOR-universal sequence is from IAPM 10], the proof is also similar to that. A simpli ed proof of IAPM was given by J. H astad ( 7] ) The proof of theorem 1 is inspired by this simpler proof. Theorem 1: The success probability of any adversary in the above game is at most (2 + (jSj + 2n(d ? 1)) 2 )=2 m , where F and G are m-bit functions. T 1 ; :::; T i , its choice of l(i) is xed. Similarly, given the whole update sequence, its choice of the colliding CAT is also xed.
We will use C to denote the sequence of labels C 1 ; :::; C n in the n trees. similarly V will denote the sequence of labels V 1 ; :::; V n . Of course C is a random variable, function of F and G, and more precisely should be written C(F; G). V i in turn is a function of C 1 ; :::C i?1 (as l(i) is a function of the latter).
So, consider any execution path of the game above, i.e. branching on the various random choices of the random functions F and G. Note that there is no branching due to the choices of the adversaries, as adversary's choice is xed at each internal node of the execution tree.
For each leaf of this execution tree, let c denote the xed value of the random variable C, and v the xed value of the random variable V . We will use superscripts on c and v, i.e. c i , and v i , to denote the corresponding values in the tree T i . Similarly, we will use c 0 and v 0 for the labels in T 0 . Of course, v i is completely determined by c 1 ; :::; c i?1 Similarly, v 0 is completely determined by c 1 ; :::; c n .
For each node s in a tree T (excluding the root r), which is the ith daughter of its parent t, de ne M(s) = V (s) G(V (t); i). Note that M is a function of G, and V , latter being a function of G and C.
For any c and xed value of G (say g), consider the event PD(c,g) (pairwise di erent):
Event PD(c,g): 8i; j 2 1::n]8s 2 S i ; 8t 2 S j ; (i; s) 6 = (j; t) : (M i (s) 6 = M j (t))( c i (s) 6 = c j (t)) Thus, PD(c; G) is a random variable, and so is PD(C (F; G) ; G). We will denote the latter by just PD. Pr PD(c; G)] 2 W.l.o.g. assume that the path di erent in the colliding CAT T 0 from T n is the leftmost path (while V n (r) = V 0 (r)), and let the leftmost leaf be called z. We will also call the leftmost path the attack path.
The following event E1 happens with high probability.
Event E1: There exists a node s 2 S ? frg on the path from r to z (the leftmost leaf), such that for all i 2 1::n], and all t 2 S i ? frg, M 0 (s) 6 = M i (t).
In other words, there is a node on the attack path, which has its M labels di erent from the M labels of every updated node in every round. We calculate the probability of event E1 not happening. We calculate this probabilty under the condition C = c and PD(c; G).
Let s be the node closest to the root, such that V n (s) 6 = V 0 (s). Let u be the parent of s. Since, M 0 (s) = G(V 0 (u); 0) V 0 (s), and V 0 (u) = V n (u), we have, M 0 (s) = G(V n (u); 0) V 0 (s). Now, we calculate the probability that M 0 (s) = M i (t), the latter being G(V i (U(t)); j) V i (t), where j is such that t = D(U(t); j).
We calculate the probability of G(V n (u); 0) V 0 (s) = G(V i (U(t)); j) V i (t), or G(V n (u); 0) G(V i (U(t)); j) = V 0 (s) V i (t). Now, since C = c, the labels V 0 , V n and V i are xed values. Pr PD(c; G)] The last equation follows by Lemma 1, unless i = n, j = 0, and U(t) = u (this implies t = s), in which case the probability is zero if v 0 (s) is di erent from v n (s), and one if the they are same. But the latter case cannot happen by the above assumption on s.
The lemma follows by noticing that each update causes at most 2(d ? 1) nodes to have their labels altered, where d is the depth of the leaf nodes. These 2(d ? 1) nodes include the nodes from the leaf to the root (excluding the root), and the neighboring path. 
Equations (1) and (2) 
Inequality (5)follows by Lemma 2. Inequality (7) follows by lemma 3. By Lemma 4 and (7), the probability of event E1 not happening is at most 3 (2 d +2n(d? 
More optimizations
The security bound from Theorem 1 suggests that the number of updates must not exceed 2 m=2 , where m is the block size of the underlying block cipher. Thus the index v stored at each node need only be m=2 bits long. This also suggests that the V -labels of the two children of a node can be packed into a single block of size m bits, and encrypted together as one block. In this case, since the \address sensitivity" is built into how the two V lables are packed into a block, one does not even require the su x zero or one while computing the \whitening" G. The C -label for the two children is now combined into one, and let's say, it is stored with the left child. Then the consistency requirement on a CAT now is:
There is an analogue of theorem 1 for this scheme. The proofs will be given in the full version of the paper.
Initialization of the Tree
When using the parallelizable authentication scheme described here to secure memory, the initialization of the memory and the tree is of practical importance. It can be shown that at the initial state (i.e. in the initial tree) all the V labels can be set to zero. In other words, they need not satisfy the consistency requirements of a CAT, namely that all the V labels be distinct. This leads to a very e cient implementation, and even more so in the optimization described in section 4.
Alternative Schemes
This scheme is similar to the , XECB-MAC ( 6] ) and PMAC scheme ( 2] ), except that it is incremental. Each node now has a C label and an M value. The M value is only computed during updates (i.e. it is secret), and is not stored as a part of the tree (only C labels are stored).
The plaintext values at the leaves are the C labels (this misnaming will become clear later). The M values at the leaf nodes are computed by decrypting the C labels of the leafs after \whitening". The M values at internal nodes are computed by an xor-sum of the M values of all its children. The C label of internal nodes is computed by encrypting the M value of that node.
We observe that the M value of any internal node s(including the root) is the XOR-sum of the M values of all the leaf nodes under this internal node s. By keeping the C labels of the internal node, we assure integrity of a leaf by just checking the path from the leaf to the root. The \address sensitivity" is built into the leaves by the whitening of the leaves.
Incremental Encryption and Authentication
We now describe a further optimization when the data to be authenticated is also to be stored encrypted. In this optimization, the data at each leaf is encrypted using IAPM 10], except with a minor modi cation for generating the authentication tag block.
Essentially, when the data corresponding to a leaf is modi ed, it is encyrpted using a new index for the leaf (for whitening purposes). As in section 2, all the nodes on the path from this leaf to the root also get new indices. To generate the last block (as in IAPM { the authentication tag block), the checksum of the data is rst whitened with a value generated from the index of the parent of the current leaf, followed by block encryption, and then post-whitened with a value generated from the index of this leaf.
The index for the leaf, and this encrypted tag value is stored as V and C labels respectively. The encrypted data is stored as additional ciphertext labels for the leaf nodes.
As before, a colliding CAT C 0 has the same V label for the root as the last tree in the update seqeunce. However, now any one of the labels e i] for some leaf l maybe di erent from that of the same label in tree T n .
On an update, the V label of the leaf is also chosen in a sequence now. Thus, V i+1 (s) = V i (r) + 1 + d ? d 0 , for each node s 2 S.
The adversary is adaptive and has chosen plaintext power in the rst phase in the sense that it chooses which leaf is to be updated in each round, and also provides the plaintext for all the blocks in that leaf.
Let's assume that each leaf has B blocks of data stored with it. The encrypted data will be stored in B nodes which will be children of the leaf nodes (the leaf node is now a misnomer). For a leaf l, these nodes will be referred to by l k] ( 
Finally, the C label for any leaf l is given by:
where j is such l is the jth daughter of U(l), and checksum is the xor-sum of all the B plaintext blocks at leaf l. This label will also be called the authentication tag. Note that, only leafs in the set of updated nodes may have its authentication tags modi ed.
The nodes l k] will also be called data blocks. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, though more involved. In particular,event PD will be generalized now to include the pairwise distinctness of N and M variables of the data blocks.
The updated dataD i+1 will be the data block nodes at leaf l(i). We will use C i to refer to the C labels at all the internal nodes, the leaf nodes and the data block nodes. Similarly, c will be used to represent such a constant. We now consider g such that PD(c; g) holds. Looking at the conditions in the numerator, since C is xed to c, v is xed (as the v variables are de ned by c), and p is xed, and xing G to g xes the M variables to a single value (with all Ms di erent as PD(c; g) holds). Similarly, all the Ns are distinct. Since F is a permutation, there is exactly one F which satis es the conditions in the numerator above. For the denominator, for each G such that PD(c; G) holds, there is exactly one F satisfying the condition in the denominator. Pr PD(c; G)] 2 W.l.o.g. assume that the path di erent in the colliding CAT T 0 from T n is the leftmost path (while V n (r) = V 0 (r)), and let the leftmost leaf be called z. We will also call the leftmost path the attack path.
Consider the following three events E1,E2 and E3.
Event E1: There exists a node s 2 S ? frg on the path from r to z (the leftmost leaf), such that for all i 2 1::n], and all t 2 ( S i ? frg) D i , M 0 (s) 6 = M i (t).
In other words, there is a node on the attack path, which has its M labels di erent from the M labels of every updated node in every round (including the M labels of updated data blocks). 
Further Optimizations
Just as in section 4, the V labels in the combined scheme of section 6 can be of size m=2 bits. Moreover, now the authentication tag can be computed as follows. Let G 1 be the m=2 most signi cant bits of G, and G 0 be the least signi cant m=2 bits of G.
Then for any left-child leaf l, and its right sibling l 0 , C i+1 (l) = F( checksum 0 (l); checksum 0 (l 0 )] G(V i+1 (U(l); j))) G 1 (V i+1 (l); B); G 0 (V i+1 (l 0 ); B)] where checksum 0 is the least signi cant m=2 bits of the checksum.
